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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada released its judgment in Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Chhina.1 The case raised a rather simple
*
Jared Will is a member of the bar in Ontario, Quebec and New York State and has been
practising Canadian immigration and refugee law since 2006. He specializes in complex
immigration and refugee matters, particularly those involving constitutional law, international
criminal law, exclusion, inadmissibility and national security issues. He has recently been
counsel on a number of long-term detention cases and is counsel in Brown et al. v. Canada,
the ongoing challenge to the constitutionality of Canada’s immigration detention legislation.
He was counsel for the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers before the Supreme Court
of Canada in Chhina. He would like to thank Caitlin Leach not only for her impeccable
editing, but also for her unfailing intellectual rigour and honesty in providing substantive
feedback on an early draft of this article.
1

[2019] S.C.J. No. 29, 2019 SCC 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chhina”].
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question: Can a non-citizen detained by the Canadian state under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act2 challenge the legality of his or her detention before a
superior court by way of habeas corpus? While some thought that the answer had
to be “yes”, and the government unsurprisingly argued that it is always “no”, the
Court’s somewhat less than emphatic response was a resounding “perhaps occasionally”.
I frame the Chhina Court’s sidestepping of both the common law and the Charter3
questions before it as a perpetuation of two discernable trends. It reﬂects the
ambiguities created around the rights of non-citizens in Canadian Charter jurisprudence and in liberal rights discourse more generally. The appeal in Chhina provided
an opportunity for the Court to grapple with the fundamental question of whether the
state can justify differential protection of the liberty interests of non-citizens. It
squarely raised the question of what rights a non-citizen could have to challenge the
border being imposed around them in the form of a prison cell. It also expressly
raised the question of what it would take to justify any limitation on those rights.
Instead of addressing those questions, however, the judgment in Chhina thus further
cements a thread whereby those hard questions remain unanswered.
At its core, the judgment in Chhina is an affirmation of a common law discretion
for superior courts to decline jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications from
immigration detainees without considering the fact that declining jurisdiction
amounts to an absolute denial of the Charter-protected right for detainees to seek
release by way of habeas corpus.4 As a result, the Canadian state, as the appellant
in Chhina, succeeded in empowering courts to deny the section 10(c) Charter right
to habeas corpus without providing any speciﬁc justiﬁcation for the denial of that
right. In other words, the judgment maintains an uneasy status quo in which
immigration detainees and those affected by their detention are partially excluded
from a critical forum for the protection of liberty interests. This is achieved without
any engagement of the basic requirements for justifying prima facie Charter
violations.
Further, the Court’s equivocation on the central questions posed on the appeal
falls squarely within a recognizable trend in Canadian jurisprudence on the
fundamental rights of non-citizens, wherein critical questions repeatedly go unanswered. The judgment in Chhina represents another instance of the courts painting
the rights of non-citizens in broad, grey strokes. The result of such deliberate
indecision is that the rights and interests of those most vulnerable to abuses of state
power remain effectively unprotected.
Where those affected are marginalized, disenfranchised and regarded as inher2

S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”].

3

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4

Charter, s. 10(c).
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ently threatening,5 any grey areas left around what are supposed to be their rights are
readily displaced by decision-makers who are inclined to defer to the state’s
sovereignty over migrants and protect the power to control migration. Moreover,
ambiguities in the law serve as practical obstacles to access to justice. It is no small
thing to embark on costly and time-consuming litigation when the applicable rules
are largely unknown and where it remains unclear whether the court will even hear
the case.
After brieﬂy referencing the scholarship on immigration exceptionalism in
Canadian Charter jurisprudence, I turn to the signiﬁcance of habeas corpus for
immigration detainees and a review of how that issue had been treated in earlier case
law. I then brieﬂy describe the facts of Mr. Chhina’s case before moving on to the
judgment and outlining the majority and the dissent. I then brieﬂy and critically
describe the practical implications of the majority decision. In the ﬁnal section, I
seek to describe a core contradiction within liberal theory to illustrate its replication
in Chhina, producing yet another example of immigration exceptionalism in
Canadian law that appears without any articulated justiﬁcation.
II. IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM

IN

CANADIAN CHARTER JURISPRUDENCE

The existing scholarship describes, in some detail, Canadian courts’ dilution of
Charter protections for non-citizens in the immigration and refugee law domains. I
do not propose to revisit those discussions here, but suffice to say that the rights to
equality, liberty, security of the person and the “principles of fundamental justice”
have come to mean less for non-citizens subjected to the expansive powers of the
state under immigration legislation than they do in other legal contexts.6 The
statutory powers provided by the IRPA to arrest, interrogate, detain and deport are
equally or more expansive and intrusive than those created by any other piece of
5
See Stephanie J. Silverman & Petra Molnar, “Everyday Injustices: Barriers to Access to
Justice for Immigration Detainees in Canada” (2016) 35:1 Refugee Survey Q. 109, at 115.
See also Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2005); Mary Bosworth & Sarah Turnbull, “Immigration Detention, Punishment, and the Criminalization of Migration” in Sharon Pickering &
Julie Ham, eds., The Routledge Handbook on Crime and International Migration (Oxford:
Routledge, 2015) 91, at 97.
6
See Gerald Heckman, “Revisiting the Application of Section 7 of the Charter in
Immigration and Refugee Protection” (2017) 68 U.N.B.L.J. 312; Catherine Dauvergne, “How
the Charter has Failed Non-citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of
Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill L.J. 663; Joshua Blum, “The Chiarelli Doctrine:
Immigration Exceptionalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (June 20,
2020), U.B.C. L. Rev. [forthcoming], online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636989>.
See also Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2019), at 92; and Rayner Thwaites, “Discriminating
Against Non-Citizens Under the Charter: Charkaoui and Section 15” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s
L.J. 670.

145

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

Canadian legislation.7 In many instances, those powers are exercised without
judicial8 or even administrative9 oversight. And yet it is precisely in this domain of
expansive statutory powers where basic, constitutionalized rights protections are
most critical that they have been repeatedly diluted.
The extent of the divergence between Charter law outside the immigration
context and the application of the Charter vis-à-vis immigration law is perhaps best
demonstrated by a recent trilogy of judgments of the Federal Court of Appeal:
Kreishan, Moretto and Revell.10 In all three cases, the Federal Court of Appeal found
that the question of whether section 7 of the Charter is engaged by a legislative
provision is context-sensitive, and adopted a novel legal standard in order to ﬁnd
that it was not engaged.11
In Moretto, on which the Court of Appeal then relied in Revell, the Court
considered itself bound to apply the Supreme Court’s judgment in Medovarski to the
effect that consequences of deportation do not engage section 7 of the Charter,
despite accepting that the evidence before it established a breach of the security of
the person interest as deﬁned by the Supreme Court itself.12 By declining to apply
the accepted legal standard for a breach of security of the person to the evidence
before it and instead developing new standards for engagement in order to ﬁnd that
section 7 is not engaged by the provisions in issue, the Federal Court of Appeal
maintained a state of exception for section 7 of the Charter when applied to
immigration laws.
7

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 16, 33-50, 55-60.

8

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 55(2), 55(3.1), 56(1).

9

Bill C-98, An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and the Canada
Border Services Agency Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess.,
42nd Parl., 2019 would have placed the Canada Border Services Agency, which is primarily
responsible for arrest and detention under the IRPA, under the authority of the Civilian
Review and Complaints Commission. However, the Bill died on the Senate table at the end
of the 2019 Parliamentary Session.
10

Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 972,
2019 FCA 223 (F.C.A.); Moretto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2019] F.C.J. No. 1194, 2019 FCA 261 (F.C.A.); and Revell v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 1195, 2019 FCA 262 (F.C.A.).
11
Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 972,
2019 FCA 223, at paras. 76-77 and 130 (F.C.A.); Revell v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 1195, 2019 FCA 262, at paras. 55-56 (F.C.A.), as
endorsed in Moretto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No.
1194, 2019 FCA 261, at para. 44 (F.C.A.).
12

Moretto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 1194,
2019 FCA 261, at paras. 51-52 (F.C.A.), citing Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 31, 2005 SCC 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539
(S.C.C.) and New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999]
S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124, at para. 59 (S.C.C.).
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In Kreishan, the Federal Court of Appeal relieved itself of the burden of deciding
whether the legislative provisions in issue were consistent with the principles of
fundamental justice by applying a novel standard to ﬁnd that section 7 is not
engaged.13 Each case eschewed any consideration of what the principles of
fundamental justice actually entail for persons facing deportation. In all three cases,
the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, effectively endorsing the
application of a less-robust, immigration-speciﬁc standard for Charter protections.14
These judgments are, as noted above, only the capstone of a long-standing trend of
immigration exceptionalism in Canadian Charter jurisprudence. The judgment in
Chhina is, in some critical respects, in lockstep with this trend.
As I will argue below, this phenomenon, whereby core questions regarding the
rights of non-citizens remain unanswered — resulting in the erosion of those rights
— may be explained by the struggle within liberal legal and political theories more
generally on questions of delineating membership in liberal societies. The courts’
collective failure to grapple with the justiﬁcations, or lack thereof, for creating and
enforcing all forms of border controls, viewed as such, is thus both a product of
deﬁciency in liberal theory and a perpetuation of a state of affairs where the most
fundamental autonomies are abrogated without coherent justiﬁcations.
III. HABEAS CORPUS, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND MR. CHHINA
1.

Why Habeas Corpus Matters for Immigration Detainees

For decades, both before and after the advent of the Charter, non-citizens detained
under Canadian immigration laws were denied the right to challenge their detentions
by way of habeas corpus. Without succumbing to utopic visions of the power of
habeas corpus, it is a mechanism that provides clear and widely recognized
advantages for detainees seeking to challenge the legality of their detention.15
Under the IRPA, non-citizens can be detained, with or without a warrant and
always without judicial oversight,16 for a variety of reasons, including the belief that
they will not appear for further examination or for removal, the Minister’s ongoing
13

Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] F.C.J. No. 972,
2019 FCA 223, at paras. 76-77 and 130 (F.C.A.).
14

Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] S.C.C.A. No.
398, 2020 CanLII 17609 (S.C.C.); Moretto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 482, 2020 CanLII 25171 (S.C.C.); and Revell v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 482, 2020 CanLII 25169
(S.C.C.).
15
See Siena Anstis, Joshua Blum & Jared Will, “Separate but Unequal: Immigration
Detention in Canada and the Great Writ of Liberty” (2017) 63:1 McGill L.J. 1, at 8-17 for a
more detailed description of the regime.
16
See again Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 55(1)-(2),
noting that, even where a warrant is required, it is issued by an immigration officer, not a
judicial authority.
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investigation into their background, and the belief that they may pose a danger to the
public.17 Once detained, they can be released by the detaining authority — the
Canada Border Services Agency — within the ﬁrst 48 hours of detention. If the
CBSA holds the person longer, they must appear before the Immigration Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. That administrative tribunal then
periodically holds hearings at which it decides whether or not to maintain
detention.18 A detainee can challenge a detention order by the Immigration Division
by way of judicial review in the Federal Court, but must ﬁrst seek leave from the
court to do so.19 On judicial review, the detention order is reviewed on the
deferential reasonableness standard. The Federal Court can overturn the detention
order and require that the matter be redetermined by the Division but cannot — save
very exceptional circumstances — order release.20
As the Supreme Court itself noted in Chhina, the onus and the relief available are
clear and unmistakable advantages on a habeas application as compared to the
detention review process under the IRPA even with the possibility of judicial review.
Under the IRPA, where there has been a prior decision to detain, the Minister may
rely on that decision and the absence of reasons to depart from it as the basis for a
future detention order.21 Thus, a past detention order relieves the Minister of at least
part of the burden of justifying ongoing detention. On a habeas application,
however, the Minister bears the full burden of proving the justiﬁcation and legality
of ongoing detention. The relief available is just as clearly more advantageous. A
court on a habeas application must order release if the Minister fails to meet its
burden. The only judicial process available under the IRPA framework is an
application for judicial review, wherein the Federal Court’s jurisdiction is, save
exceptional circumstances, limited to ordering redetermination of the issue by the
administrative tribunal.
Another clear advantage of habeas proceedings is that, whereas the Immigration
Division lacks jurisdiction to remedy unnecessarily harsh or abusive conditions of
detention, a superior court can order relief from those conditions on a habeas
application. Thus, for example, if an immigration detainee is being held in a
maximum-security criminal jail without justiﬁcation (as they often are22), the
17

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 55, 57-58.

18

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 57-58.

19

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 72.

20

Chhina, at para. 65.

21

Chhina, at paras. 62-63.

22

In the 2018–2019 ﬁscal year, 1,679 immigration detainees were held in provincial
facilities: Canada Border Services Agency, “Annual Detention Statistics – 2012-2019”,
online: <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/detent/stat-2012-2019-eng.html>. At least of
those with reported cases, many are subject to maximum-security conditions. See for
example: Chhina, at para. 9; Toure v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety), [2018] O.J. No.
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Immigration Division cannot order a transfer to a specialized, non-criminal,
low-security immigration facility.23 A superior court can and in fact has done so.24
2.

The Canadian Case Law before Chhina

Prior to the two appellate judgments directly at issue in Chhina — the Alberta
Court of Appeal’s decision that was before the Court and the Ontario decision in
Chaudhary25 which was endorsed and followed by the Alberta Court of Appeal26 —
habeas corpus had long been unavailable to immigration detainees. There had
emerged a common law principle, known as the Peiroo27 exception, whereby
superior courts were to decline jurisdiction in “immigration matters” because of the
existence of a “complete, comprehensive and expert” statutory schedule created by
Parliament to deal with those issues.
Notably, neither Peiroo itself nor the Supreme Court’s judgment endorsing it had
anything to do with detainees challenging the legality of their detention.28 These
were cases where individuals sought review by way of habeas corpus of other types
of immigration decisions that affected their liberty interests — usually challenges to
acts that could lead to their deportation — without dealing with the legality of a
detention. Thus, in some senses, it is perfectly logical that when the Supreme Court
endorsed the generic “immigration matters” exception in May and Khela, it did so
without considering section 10(c) of the Charter.29 Their silence is justiﬁable in
4230, 2018 ONCA 681, at para. 1 (Ont. C.A.); Ogiamien v. Ontario (Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services), [2016] O.J. No. 4002, 2016 ONSC 4126, at para. 50 (Ont.
S.C.J.); and Scotland v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 4242, 2017 ONSC 4850,
at para. 2 (Ont. S.C.J.).
23
Chhina, at para. 57; and Brown v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2017] F.C.J. No. 761, 2017 FC 710, 25 Admin. L.R. (6th) 191, at para. 129 (F.C.), citing
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Jama, [2007] I.D.D. No. 6, 2007 CanLII
12831 (Can. I.R.B.).
24

Toure v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2017] O.J.
No. 5295, 2017 ONSC 5878, at paras. 68-92 (Ont. S.C.J.).
25
Chaudhary v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2015]
O.J. No. 1055, 2015 ONSC 1503 (Ont. S.C.J.).
26
Chhina v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (September 2, 2016),
No. 160576914X1 (Alta. Q.B.); Chhina v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
[2017] A.J. No. 840, 2017 ABCA 248, 56 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1 (Alta. C.A.).
27
Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] O.J. No. 805, 69
O.R. (2d) 253, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 574 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Peiroo”].
28

Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] O.J. No. 805, 69
O.R. (2d) 253, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 574 (Ont. C.A.); Reza v Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 49, [1994]
2 S.C.R. 394, at 405, 116 D.L.R. (4th) 61 [hereinafter “Reza”].
29

See May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R.
809 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “May”], which contains only a passing reference to s. 10(c) at para.
70; and Mission Institution v. Khela, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502,
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those cases because the section 10(c) Charter right to habeas corpus was simply not
in issue, as it applies only to persons who are actually detained.
Nonetheless, some lower courts30 (and, in one instance each, the Quebec and
Ontario Courts of Appeal31) came to apply the Peiroo exception even when the
habeas corpus application in issue was brought by an immigration detainee in
respect of the legality of his or her detention. As a result, immigration detainees
were denied access to habeas corpus, despite the obvious breach of section 10(c)
entailed by that denial, and without consideration of that issue.
The case that became the appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada was
initiated by Tusif Chhina. When he ﬁled his application for habeas corpus in May
2016, he had already been detained for 13 months. He argued before the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench that his detention was unlawful because of its length and
uncertain duration and because of the conditions of his detention.
The Court of Queen’s Bench, applying Peiroo, declined jurisdiction, ﬁnding that
the IRPA regime provided Mr. Chhina with an adequate alternative to habeas
corpus. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Alberta overturned that decision,
following instead the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Chaudhary and
noting that habeas corpus was a more advantageous remedy to which he should
therefore have access pursuant to the Supreme Court’s judgment in May.
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. By the time the case was
before the Supreme Court, Mr. Chhina had been deported and his case was therefore
moot. The Court nonetheless elected to hear the appeal because of “the importance
of clearly delineating the exceptions to habeas corpus”.32
At the Supreme Court, Mr. Chhina’s counsel and some of the interveners argued
in light of the protection of the right to habeas corpus under section 10(c) of the
Charter, any limitation on that right must be justiﬁable under norms akin to those
at para. 42 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khela”]. See again Peiroo and Reza, neither of which so
much as mention s. 10(c) of the Charter.
30
R. v. Paciﬁcador, [1998] O.J. No. 658, at para. 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.); R. v. Zundel, [2003]
O.J. No. 4951, at para. 9 (Ont. S.C.J.); Kippax v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] O.J. No.
6324, 2014 ONSC 3685, at paras. 13-16 (Ont. S.C.J.); Sancho c. Quebec (Directeur de
l’établissement pénitencier à Rivière-des-Prairies), [2008] J.Q. no 11211, 2008 QCCS 5346,
at paras. 3-6 (Que. S.C.); Chaudhary v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), [2015] O.J. No. 1055, 2015 ONSC 1503, at para. 26 (Ont. S.C.J.).
31

Apaolaza-Sancho c. Quebec (Director of Établissement de détention de Rivière-desPrairies), [2008] Q.J. No. 7743, 2008 QCCA 1542 (Que. S.C.); Baroud v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] O.J. No. 43, 22 O.R. (3d) 255, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 308
(Ont. C.A.).
32
Chhina, at para. 15. As argued herein, the majority nonetheless failed to delineate,
much less to “clearly delineate”, the scope of the exceptions to habeas corpus.
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imposed on legislative violations under section 1 of the Charter.33 The Court was
thus directly confronted with the question of whether a common law limitation on
the right to habeas corpus was consistent with the Charter.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT
1.

Majority

(a)

Overview

The majority of the Court essentially adopted the approach of the Alberta Court
of Appeal, which had in turned followed the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s judgment
in Chaudhary. The Court found that in cases where habeas corpus provides a more
advantageous remedy than that available for immigration detainees under the IRPA,
superior courts should not decline jurisdiction and should hear and decide habeas
corpus applications. Whether or not habeas corpus provides a more advantageous
remedy will largely turn, in the majority’s opinion, on the particular issues raised by
the detainee seeking to challenge the legality of his or her detention. In other words,
habeas corpus was found to be a more advantageous remedy for some but not all
forms of unlawful detention. As detailed below, the judgment leaves many
unanswered questions with respect to how lower courts are to assess which issues
fall into which category.
(b)

Sidestepping Section 10(c) and Section 1 of the Charter

In the very ﬁrst two paragraphs of the decision, the majority’s sidestep of the
Charter issues is apparent. The judgment begins with the recognition that “[e]ntrenched in s. 10(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to
habeas corpus permits those in detention to go before a provincial superior court
and demand to know whether the detention is justiﬁed in law”.34 This recognition
is immediately followed by a caveat: “Despite the importance of habeas corpus, this
Court has carved out two limited exceptions to its availability.”35 Thus, from the
very outset, the issues are framed as there being common law exceptions to an
otherwise Charter-protected right to habeas corpus.
This is of course not the only circumstance in which the courts have grappled with
common law limitations on Charter rights. There is a well-developed body of
jurisprudence on such situations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judges
must exercise the discretion afforded under common law rules in a manner
33

See Chhina: Factum of the Respondent Tusif Ur Rehman Chhina; Factum of the
Intervener Queen’s Prison Law Clinic; Factum of the Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties
Association; and Factum of the Intervener Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, online:
<www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=37770>.
34

Chhina, at para. 1.

35

Chhina, at para. 2.
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consistent with the Charter.36 Therefore, at least in principle, the question raised in
Chhina was whether the exercise of the discretion to decline jurisdiction to hear
habeas applications from immigration detainees constitutes a justiﬁable infringement of section 10(c) of the Charter. Elsewhere, the Court has made clear that the
analytical framework adopted for determining whether an exercise of judicial
discretion is consistent with the Charter must ensure that it “incorporates the essence
of s. 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test” and is “subject to no lower a standard of
compliance with the Charter than legislative enactment”.37 In other words, where
judicial discretion is the state action that breaches a Charter right, that action is
subject to a substantively similar standard of justiﬁcation as is Parliament when it
violates Charter rights legislatively.
This standard has come to be known as the Dagenais/Mentuck test. While the test
was initially developed in the context of limitations on freedom of expression under
section 2(b) of the Charter, the Court has already recognized that “its principles have
broader application”.38 At the core of the analysis, as in the Oakes test for legislative
violations of the Charter,39 are the questions of rationality and proportionality: is the
measure necessary to achieve some important objective, and, if so, do its salutary
effects outweigh the infringement of a Charter right?40 In some cases, the courts
must weigh competing Charter rights.41 In others, such as the case at bar, there are
36

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835,
at 865 and 875 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C. [hereinafter “Dagenais”] (“the common law rule
does not authorize publication bans that limit Charter rights in an unjustiﬁable manner”);
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. The Queen, [2011] S.C.J. No. 3, 2011 SCC 3, [2011] 1
S.C.R. 65, at paras. 13-14 (S.C.C.); and British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, at para. 56
(S.C.C.).
37

R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at para. 27
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”]; and Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of
Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, at para. 45ff. (S.C.C.).
See also Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2,
2011 SCC 2, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19, at para. 56 (S.C.C.) (“The Dagenais/Mentuck rule requires
neither more nor less than the one from Oakes”); and R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, at para. 99 (S.C.C.), La Forest J., concurring (“[W]hen a common law
rule is found to infringe upon a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter, it must be
justiﬁed in the same way as legislative rules”).
38
R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726, at para. 7
(S.C.C.).
39
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Oakes”]. See further R. v. J. (K.R.), [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906,
at para. 79 (S.C.C.) on the residual yet critical role of the proportionality assessment.
40

R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76, at paras. 22-39 (S.C.C.).

41

See, for example, Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] S.C.J. No. 104,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.),
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no competing Charter rights, and courts are to weigh other public interests, such as
the public interest in the effective administration of justice or the social value of the
protection of the vulnerable, against the Charter infringement.42
Notwithstanding this framework and its uncontested applicability where other
Charter rights are in issue, the Court in Chhina proceeded to endorse the common
law exceptions to the right to habeas corpus notwithstanding their conﬂict with
section 10(c) of the Charter. The majority did so in express terms:
This appeal concerns the scope and application of the Peiroo exception, providing
the Court with an opportunity to clarify when a complete, comprehensive and
expert statutory scheme provides for review that is as broad and advantageous as
habeas corpus such that an applicant will be precluded from bringing an application
for habeas corpus.43

The Charter question is addressed solely in the footnote to the above-cited paragraph
which stated that “Although Mr. Chhina sought to argue before this Court that the
common law Peiroo exception violates s. 10(c) of the Charter and cannot be saved
under s. 1, he failed to ﬁle a notice of constitutional question within the speciﬁed
timeline. Accordingly, that argument is not before the Court in this appeal.”44
The majority did not consider the converse proposition, namely that it was the
Crown that was asking the Court to endorse a common law exception to a Charter
where the Court weighed the right to a fair and public trial against the freedom of expression
of the press.
42
See, for example, British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, at paras. 67ff. (S.C.C.); R. v.
Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 2001 SCC 76, at paras. 31-32 (S.C.C.); and Vickery v. Nova
Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] S.C.J. No. 23, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671 (S.C.C.).
43

Chhina, at para. 16.

44

Chhina, at footnote 1 to para. 16. After the Crown’s written arguments were put before
the Court, Mr. Chhina’s counsel ﬁled a motion for an extension of time to state a
constitutional question. They argued that Mr. Chhina was seeking to exercise his s. 10(c)
Charter right to habeas corpus relief and that the Crown’s argument in reply — that courts
have discretion to decline to hear such applications and should exercise it against immigration
detainees — necessarily raised the question of whether such an exercise of discretion could
be justiﬁed under the “values and principles” enshrined in s. 1 of the Charter (Chhina,:
Respondent’s Motion for Extension of Time (September 28, 2018), SCC File 37770. In reply,
the Crown argued that this issue had not been litigated in the courts below and that it would
be prejudiced if it were decided without a full evidentiary record. The Crown also stated,
without argument, that it cannot be “assumed” that refusing to hear a habeas corpus
application breaches s. 10(c) of the Charter, which speciﬁcally guarantees access to habeas
corpus for all detainees (Chhina: Appellant’s Response to Motion to Extend Time (October
9, 2018), SCC File 37770. The Court dismissed the motion without reasons (Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Chhina (October 16, 2018), SCC File 37770 (Order
of Côté J.). This of course foreshadowed the sidestep of the Charter in the judgment on the
merits.
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right without ﬁling a notice of constitutional question within the speciﬁed time
frame. As such, another way of phrasing what the majority elected to do in Chinna
would be to say: “Although the Court recognizes that the right to habeas corpus is
protected under s. 10(c) of the Charter for persons who are detained, it will endorse
an exception to that right without consideration of s. 1 of the Charter.”
That the Court is endorsing a common law exception to a Charter-protected right
is made plain throughout the judgment. The majority ﬁnds that the “exceptions
acknowledge the development of sophisticated procedural vehicles in our modern
legal system and their ability to fully protect fundamental rights such as habeas
corpus”.45 The right to habeas corpus is the right to a particular procedural vehicle
to challenge the legality of one’s detention, and the Court is expressly ﬁnding that
courts can nonetheless rely on the common law to deny the right to habeas corpus
where alternative procedural vehicles have been made available.
That the Court is endorsing a common law exception to a Charter right in
furtherance of other policy objectives is also expressly stated in the majority’s
judgment:
Both of these exceptions target similar concerns, primarily the “need to restrict the
growth of collateral methods of attacking convictions or other deprivations of
liberty” (May, at para. 35). By affirming such statutory schemes, the standard set
out in May ensures the constitutional right to habeas corpus is protected, while also
realizing judicial economy, avoiding duplicative proceedings, and reducing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions and forum shopping.46

Had the issue been framed as the conditions under which courts can rely on the
common law to deny Charter rights, one would have to ask whether those policy
objectives are “pressing and substantial”, whether this means of achieving them is
minimally impairing and whether the infringements are proportionate to the
objectives. Having declined to conceive of the judgment as endorsing a common law
violation of a Charter right, the Court effectively sidestepped what are otherwise
basic, mandatory thresholds for the justiﬁcation of such violations.
A comparison to the Court’s approach in its two other recent habeas corpus cases
is instructive. In May, the Court acknowledged and affirmed the existence of the
Peiroo exception, but declined to apply it or make any generalizable ﬁndings about
its applicability in the prison law setting at issue.47 Thus, there was no live question
in that appeal as to whether the Peiroo exception could be applied to a detainee
without applying some version of the Dagenais/Mentuck test. Similarly, in Khela,
the Court was rejecting the argument that provincial superior courts should decline
45

Chhina, at para. 26.

46

Chhina, at para. 29.

47

May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809,
at para. 44 (S.C.C.).
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habeas jurisdiction to review transfer decisions in the prison law context.48 In both
cases, there is no suggestion that the Peiroo exception could be applied to any
proceedings under the legislative scheme at issue.49 In Chhina, however, the Court
ﬁnds that there may well be habeas applications brought to challenge detentions
under the IRPA for which superior courts should decline jurisdiction.
It can of course be plausibly argued that the Court has simply left open, to be
litigated another day, the question of when and whether an application of the Peiroo
exception to an immigration detainee could be justiﬁed under the Dagenais/Mentuck
framework. However, what the Court undeniably did was to leave the jurisdictional
hurdle for each detainee contemplating or seeking habeas corpus relief to overcome
in their own case, without subjecting that hurdle’s existence or application to any
requirement of Charter justiﬁcation.
(c)

What Goes Undecided?

In addition to leaving the Charter issues undecided or implicitly deciding them in
favour of the Crown, the majority judgment also fails to deﬁne the scope of the
potential application of the Peiroo exception. The result is that immigration
detainees cannot determine with any degree of certainty whether or not they will be
able to seize a superior court with the question of the legality of their detention.
The majority reaffirms the standard set in May, namely that “a provincial superior
court should also decline jurisdiction where the legislator has put in place ‘a
complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review
at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less
advantageous’”.50 The question then becomes how courts are to determine what
constitutes a “complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme” and whether
it is “no less advantageous” than review by way of habeas corpus. Much, however,
remains undecided on that point.
First, the Court in Chhina does not decide which party bears the burden of proof
and persuasion on this issue. Is it a preliminary issue on which the detainee bears the
burden, or is it a potential ground for the Crown to assert on which the Crown bears
the burden? Who has to prove that there is or is not a “complete, comprehensive and
expert statutory scheme” and whether it is “no less advantageous” in the circumstances at bar? While there is a good argument for it being the Crown’s burden
because it is the Crown asking the court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction, the
practice in the lower courts pre-Chhina was to place that burden on the detainee,51
48

Mission Institution v. Khela, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 2014 SCC 24 (S.C.C.).

49

Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20.

50

Chhina, at para. 2, citing May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC
82, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
51

See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Dadzie, [2016] O.J. No. 5185,
2016 ONSC 6045, at paras. 33ff. (Ont. S.C.J.); Ali v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and
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and nothing in Chhina displaces that precedent.
Second, the judgment fails to clearly deﬁne the standard that will be applied to
determine whether or not habeas corpus provides a more advantageous forum. The
majority judgment emphasized that the jurisdictional question will be decided
primarily as a function of the issue(s) raised by the detainee; i.e., the grounds upon
which the detainee challenges the legality of his or her detention. As the majority
puts it, “whether such a scheme is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus must
be considered with respect to the particular basis upon which the lawfulness of the
detention is challenged”.52 In the context of immigration detainees, the most speciﬁc
question is “whether the IRPA provides a review procedure that is at least as broad
and advantageous as habeas corpus regarding the speciﬁc challenges to the legality
of the detention raised by the habeas corpus application”.53
Sometimes, the question will be easily resolved. For example, as the Court itself
notes, “it may be helpful to look at whether a statutory scheme fails entirely to
include the grounds set out in the application for habeas corpus. If so, the scheme
will not be as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.”54 This is true in cases,
including the one identiﬁed by the Court itself, where the issue is whether the
conditions of detention have rendered it unlawful and where the remedy sought is
an amelioration of those conditions.55
In all other cases, however, opacity prevails. As the Court puts it, the statutory
“scheme will also fail to oust habeas corpus if it provides for review on the grounds
in the application, but the review process is not as broad and advantageous as that
available through habeas corpus, considering both the nature of the process and any
advantages each procedural vehicle may offer”.56 While this may seem like a logical
standard, it is problematic given that the Court itself identiﬁes advantages to habeas
litigation that will always be present for immigration detainees, namely: (a) the
superior court’s jurisdiction to grant release or other forms of direct relief (as
opposed to the Federal Court’s limited jurisdiction to simply refer the matter back
for redetermination by the administrative decision-maker);57 (b) that a court’s
review jurisdiction on judicial review is far more limited than on a habeas
Emergency Preparedness), [2017] O.J. No. 2145, 2017 ONSC 2660, at para. 20 (Ont. S.C.J.);
and Toure v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2017] O.J.
No. 5295, 2017 ONSC 5878, at para. 20 (Ont. S.C.J.).
52

Chhina, at para. 5 [emphasis in original].

53

Chhina, at para. 6 [emphasis added]. See also para. 42: “First, it is necessary to ask
upon what basis the legality of the detention is being challenged.”
54

Chhina, at para. 43.
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Chhina, at paras. 57-58.
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Chhina, at para. 43.

57

Chhina, at para. 65.
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application;58 and (c) the fact that, whereas the Minister can rely on past detention
orders to justify continued detention in the IRPA process, the burdens of proof and
persuasion to justify the legality of a detention lie entirely on the Crown in habeas
proceedings.59
Given the inherently more advantageous nature of habeas proceedings in these
three respects, the judgment begs the question: in what circumstances could a
superior court ﬁnd that habeas proceedings are not more advantageous and therefore
decline jurisdiction? The majority in Chhina unmistakably invites superior courts to
perform this assessment each time and suggests that there will be occasions where
jurisdiction should be declined, but it provides no guidance as to how a court could
even ﬁnd that the ubiquitous advantages are somehow outweighed.
While there is nothing new about an appellate court leaving some questions to be
answered on the facts of each case litigated at ﬁrst instance, the Court’s decision in
Chhina remains troubling in this respect. The Court not only maintained a common
law exception to a Charter right in the absence of any Charter justiﬁcation for that
exception, while failing to deﬁne its scope in any meaningful way, but left that
exception as an obstacle for immigration detainees (who are among the poorest and
most disenfranchised litigants in the justice system) to climb in every case.
Immigration detainees and their counsel are left to wager in each case whether or
not the issue they raise will be seen as one in which habeas corpus proceedings are
suffıciently more advantageous for the superior court to elect to hear their
application. They remain saddled with jurisprudence whereby justifying a court in
providing a particular procedural form of relief, to which they are otherwise entitled
under the Charter, is their de facto burden. They must meet that burden without
clarity on what it will take to satisfy it. The chill effect is undeniable.
2.

Dissent

While the majority judgment matters most for understanding the present state of
the law and the trajectory of the jurisprudential developments, aspects of the
dissenting opinion also warrant some exploration here.
Distilled to its essence, Abella J.’s dissenting opinion is that the majority position
is based on an unduly restrictive interpretation of the relief available to detainees
under the IPRA. In Abella J.’s opinion, rather than guaranteeing access to habeas
corpus as the remedy where that statutory regime proves less advantageous, the
IRPA should be read as providing, in all cases, a means of review that is just as
beneﬁcial as habeas corpus. According to her interpretation of the IRPA, the review
regime before the Immigration Division, as supplemented by the right of judicial
58

Chhina, at para. 64.

59

Chhina, at paras. 60-63.
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review to the Federal Court, is sufficiently protective to oust the right of habeas
corpus.60
Of course, what is said above concerning the majority’s sidestep of the Peiroo
exception as a patent violation of section 10(c) of the Charter applies a fortiori to
the dissenting judgment, which would erect an insurmountable barrier to habeas
corpus relief for all immigration detainees. Justice Abella relies on section 3(3)(d)
of the IRPA, which provides that the Act must be “construed and applied in a
manner that . . . ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in order to ﬁnd that the detention
provisions can be construed and applied in a manner that makes access to a court
for habeas review unnecessary, without acknowledging that this approach amounts
to a ﬁnding that Parliament would have intended for the IRPA to impliedly oust the
section 10(c) Charter right to habeas review. Whatever the merits of the approach
taken in the dissenting judgment, it undeniably entrenches a common law exception
to the exercise of a Charter right without ever asking the question of justiﬁcation.
3.

Practical Implications
Under the majority judgment, it will sometimes be permissible for a detained
non-citizen to seek relief by way of habeas corpus. Whether they have a Charter
right to do so subject only to a sufficient Dagenais/Mentuck justiﬁcation advanced
by the Crown has been left undecided. What the detainee has to prove — if anything
— in order to access habeas relief has also been left undecided.
Equivocation on the core questions is not without practical consequences. One
can imagine the following exchange to appreciate the difficulty:
Detainee to counsel: I think my detention is illegal. Can I seek release via habeas
corpus?
Counsel: Maybe.
Detainee: I really need to get out. How do we know if my case is that kind of case
that can be decided on a habeas application?
Counsel: It’s not entirely clear.
Detainee: What do we have to prove to get the court to hear my case?
Counsel: That’s not entirely clear either.

The lack of clarity is itself an obstacle to the availability of relief by way of habeas
corpus.
60

In its recent judgment in Brown v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2020] F.C.J. No. 835, 2020 FCA 130 at para. 47 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal takes
a similar approach to Abella J., and indeed relies on her dissenting opinion, to ﬁnd that the
IRPA detention scheme, as supplemented by the obligation to apply it in conformity with the
Charter, is constitutional. Notably, the Federal Court of Appeal expressly declined to follow
a number of the key ﬁndings in Chhina. Those ﬁndings are beyond the scope of the present
comment, and Mr. Brown and his co-appellant have sought leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
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4.

Why the Sidestep and All of the Grey?

Seen in this light, the judgment in Chhina constitutes a repetition of the
immigration exceptionalism and non-justiﬁcation for state intrusions into otherwise
protected spheres of individual autonomy that have long characterized the case law
in this area.
Numerous possible explanations exist for these phenomena, and I do not wish to
discount the degree to which such decision-making is informed by nativism,
xenophobia and white supremacy. Such judgments are, however, revelatory of the
failings of mainstream liberal legal and political theories of state power when it
comes to the question of migration and the admission of the “other” among the “us”.
Risking a slight overgeneralization, liberalism struggles to provide a standard of
justice against which immigration controls can be measured. Most liberal political
theories presume the existence of a community and then develop theories of justice
within that community, with little to no attention to the question of how the
community is deﬁned or constituted. While some scholars have argued that liberal
principles of individual autonomy and equality require open borders, others have
arrived at exactly the opposite conclusion.61 While arguments for open borders have
gained little mainstream traction, efforts to provide justiﬁcations for access controls
(i.e., border controls) for liberal communities that are consistent with the central
tenets of liberalism are, at best, controversial.62
The question of border control evokes a core tension within liberalism. Those
articulating liberal open borders arguments are critiqued for failing to fully account
for the “us” versus “other” distinction that is inherent to the imagination of a
plurality of membership-based political communities that has been central to liberal
political and legal theory. Those advancing arguments for border controls are
critiqued for failing to adequately account for the notions of universal equality and
individual autonomy that are equally central to liberalism. As Catherine Dauvergne
has convincingly argued, the arguments for both open and closed borders require
some departure from the central tenets of liberalism.63
61

See, for example, M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
(New York: Basic Books, 1983), especially Chapter Two: Membership; Kevin R. Johnson,
“Open Borders?” (2003) 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 193, at 213; and Joseph Carens, “Aliens and
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 The Review of Politics 251, at 251.
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See Catherine Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for
Immigration Law” (1997) 10 Can. J.L. & Jur. 323, at 328ff., in which one prominent defence
of closed borders on communitarian grounds is examined and critiqued for its departures of
the central tenets of liberalism. For another such defence of closed borders on similar
grounds, see M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:
Basic Books, 1983).
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Catherine Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration Law” (1997) 10 Can. J.L. & Jur. 323, at 328ff.. Indeed, even where liberal legal and
political theorists conclude that some form of border control is justiﬁed under the tenets of
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This tension at the heart of liberal theory — whereby border controls are
recognized prerequisites to the liberal social order but cannot be comfortably
justiﬁed by liberalism itself64 — reproduces itself sharply in the context of migrant
detention. Border controls are expressions of “the raw sovereignty of the nation
state” that liberal political theory presumes necessary to constitute the community
within which liberal theories of justice are to be applied.65 The violence of borders
as such (as Joseph Carens has put it in the context of his liberal defence of open
borders, “borders have guards and the guards have guns”66) is reproduced viscerally
when the state physically denies the liberty of non-citizens in the process of
enforcing its borders. The affected individual is not just an imagined non-member
other, but a presumably rights-bearing individual that is physically within the nation
state and being denied her or his most basic liberty.
However, as others have noted, the rights enjoyed by non-citizens with respect to
liberty and equality somehow dissolve without so much as a proper rationalization
for that outcome when they interact with the state’s right to exclude,67 and this is no
different when it comes to migrant detention. The abstract problem of deeming that
there are outsiders who are not rights-holders within a particular liberal society
presents itself intractably to courts when faced with a person within its borders who
is nominally entitled to basic civil and procedural rights, but whose conduct or
sometimes mere presence pits them against the state’s “raw sovereignty” to exclude
non-members.
Against this background, it is not hard to understand why courts faced with a
variety of questions of migrant justice have deployed a range of techniques to avoid
confronting this central tension in liberalism, and to decline to even attempt to
justify immigration controls according to the liberal logic within which they are
constrained.68 Similarly, as argued above, the Supreme Court in Chhina failed to
liberalism, liberal theory becomes more starkly impotent when it comes to justifying the
nature and degree of border controls. On this, see further, Kevin R. Johnson, “Open Borders?”
(2003) 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 193, at 213.
64
For an accessible discussion on this tension and a review of the scholarship, see Kevin
R. Johnson, “Open Borders?” (2003) 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 193, at 205-208.
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67
See Joshua Blum, “The Chiarelli Doctrine: Immigration Exceptionalism and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (June 20, 2020), U.B.C. L. Rev. [forthcoming],
online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636989>; and Phillip Cole, Philosophies of
Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2000), at 8-10.
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even acknowledge its judgment as a signiﬁcant rights-limiting pronouncement, let
alone engage the question of whether such limitations can be justiﬁed.
V. CONCLUSION
The judgment in Chhina encapsulates two mutually reinforcing trends in the
Canadian courts’ approach to the fundamental rights of non-citizens in the
immigration and refugee law context. The judgment ﬁrst maintains the trend
whereby basic Charter rights are diluted in matters of immigration law. It is also
emblematic of the courts’ repeated sidestepping of the core questions of justiﬁcation
in immigration matters and the visceral enforcement of the member-other distinction. Insofar as it failed to counter either of those trends, it is unsurprising that the
judgment leaves immigration detainees in the lurch with respect to the availability
of habeas corpus to seek release from unlawful detention.
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